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Error is viewed... not as an extraneous and misdirected or misdirecting accident, but as an essential part of the process under consideration-its importance ... being fully comparable to that of the
factor which is normally considered, the intended and correct logical structure.
John von Neumann1
I.

INTRODUCTION

I am of the opinion that the main reason the relational theory of
contract has encountered such resistance from mainstream thinking
on the law of contract thought is that it has been interpreted as a very
paternalistic theory opposed to freedom of contract, one which has no
or very little place for competition.2 As I have argued elsewhere, this
t Department of Law, University of Durham, UK. In addition to the version
given at the conference on which this Symposium is based, earlier versions of this
paper have been given to the Department of Law, University of Leeds, March 2001;
to the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, July 2001; to the School of Law, University of Bristol,
November 2002; to a BCL Seminar, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, May 2004;
and to the Osgoode Hall Law School, Canada, September 2004. Throughout this paper I continually draw on previous work with Hugh Collins, Roger Halson, and Donald Harris.
1. J. von Neumann, ProbabilisticLogics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms
from Unreliable Components, in AUTOMATA STUDIES 43 (C.E. Shannon & J. McCarthy, eds. 1956).
2. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, ContractingWorlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 399, 404-05 (2000). In criticism, see David Campbell, The Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science, 9 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 439,
445 (2000).
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certainly was not Ian Macneil's intention, 3 and, drawing on his work,
the relational theory can readily be restated in such a way as to give
competition a central place in it.4 Nevertheless, that the relational
theory is associated with general paternalism is undeniable,5 and in
this paper I hope to call this association further into question by giving
a general defence of breach of contract from the relational perspective. In a sense I intend to go rather further than in my previous attempts to bring competition into the relational theory, for on this
occasion I do intend to argue that, in important ways, Macneil's own
views (on breach) are open to radical criticism, as are those of the
other principal contributor to the relational theory, Stewart Macaulay.
As I trust will be fully acknowledged in this paper, the defence of
breach I will put forward is very substantially indebted to the important contributions to our understanding of the remedies for breach
which a number of writers sympathetic to the relational perspective,
notably Charles Goetz, Alan Schwartz, and Robert Scott, have made,
and continue to make. Nevertheless, the predominant attitude taken
towards breach by writers with such sympathies, including Macaulay
and Macneil themselves, is that breach represents an amoral or immoral failure by the breaching party to respect, not only the obligations which contracts themselves impose, but, more importantly, those
on which contracting rests. It therefore would seem that breach must
generally be disapproved from the relational perspective.
I will argue that such disapproval is a mistake. Far from it being the
function of the law of contract to (so far as possible) prevent breach,
the function of that law is to make breach possible, although on terms
which the law regulates. This function is so central to the efficient
working of the market economy that, in an important sense, there is
very little point in passing moral judgement upon it. So long as one is
committed to the market economy, one must allow contract to perform this function; and we are all now, of course, committed to that
economy. The point I wish to stress, however, is that this is not an
instance of having to sacrifice what is "moral" to what is economically
"efficient." I will argue that the expectation principle allows breach to
work in an efficient way only by giving the parties a strong incentive
to co-operate in dealing with the errors the defendant has made when
3. David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in THE
3, 20-7
(David Campbell ed. 2001).
4. See, e.g., David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract,
in CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION: SOCIO-LEGAL INITIATIVES 40, 40-66
(David Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones eds., 1996).
5. Kennedy's rightly very influential gloss on particularly the work of Macaulay
seems to have played a large part in this, though Kennedy's views are much more
nuanced than the title of his paper would seem to have led many who have cited it to
believe: Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41
MD. L. REv. 563, 563-658 (1982).
RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL
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agreeing the terms of the contract; the manifestation of those errors in
increasing costs of performance being the reason the good faith defendant wishes to breach.6 In order to emphasise the way I am hoping to
change the view taken of the expectation principle in the relational
theory, I will put my argument in the following way. Whilst protection
of the claimant's 7 expectation is the first principle of remedies for
breach of contract, co-operation in keeping the defendant's costs of
furnishing that protection as low as possible is the second principle.
One cannot explain the basic structure of the law of remedies using
only the first principle. I hope to show one can explain that structure
using both principles, which together reveal the co-operative nature of
breach.
Whereas the principle of protecting the claimant's expectation is, of
course, so well known as to be trite law (until recent developments in
the law of restitution in particular have called it into question in England and Wales), the second principle is, to say the least, obscure.
Though it is my basic claim that the specific legal rules constituting the
second principle do already exist, the principle is not merely not
recognised but is denied by those who understand breach as amoral or
immoral, and this failure of recognition may be taken to extremes of
antagonism in the attitudes and conduct of the parties (and their advisers) to strenuously contested commercial litigation. It is not the
least ambitious of my aims that I intend my argument to have the
clear implication for those parties that they should eschew this antagonism, which fails to represent, not merely their counterparts', but their
own best interest, were they adequately self-conscious of it.

II.

THE CRITIQUE OF BREACH

There is a very surprising degree of agreement in the attitudes
taken towards breach by most proponents of the relational theory and
in the classical theory of contract to which the relational theory is normally thoroughly opposed. It had seemed that the proper attitude to
take to classical law's belief in pacta sunt servanda was to regard it as
one of the charmingly antiquated tropes which were indicative of that
law's obsolescence, but in a way which it was no longer worth challenging in detail.' Any edifice resting on foundations of this highly
ornamental but wholly dysfunctional sort cannot be repaired, but has
to be entirely replaced. It certainly was the case that, whilst the rela6. I entirely ignore the problems posed by the bad faith defendant.
7. An unfortunate consequence of the overall successful review of civil procedure conducted by Lord Woolf in the 1990s is that the perfectly well-understood term
"plaintiff" has been replaced by "claimant" in the new civil procedure rules for England and Wales.
8. The outlines of all that needed to be said were indicated in J.H. Gebhardt,
Pacta sunt servanda, 10 MOD. L. REV. 159, 159-61 (1947).
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tional theory recognised this, 9 the mainstream thinking remained forlornly mired in the past.' ° Nevertheless, one had thought that, at least
among those capable of taking a sophisticated interest in the issues, if
not all those who passed as being learned in contract law, the drastic
shortcomings of the classical law were acknowledged.
One has been a little startled, then, to see strenuous attempts being
made to claim that there is "wide acceptance of the phrase 'pactasunt
servanda""' as a central aspect of the recent attempt to revive formalism of a decidedly Langdellian sort,' 2 and to stress a basic "performance interest" in contract:
The essence of contract is performance. Contracts are made in order to be performed. This is usually the one and only ground for
their formation . . . This interest in getting the promised performance ... the performance interest ... is the only pure contractual
interest [and] is protected by specific remedies, which aim at granting the innocent party the 13
very performance promised to him, and
by substitutional remedies.
The argument for the performance interest mutually reinforces the argument for wider use of the restitutionary remedies of partial or total
disgorgement following breach of simple contract that in recent times
has enjoyed considerable influence in England and Wales, 14 for the
effect of this wider use of restitution must be to deter breach to a
much greater extent than damages quantified in the normal way.
The reason the performance interest and restitutionary arguments
are made, but also the great difficulty they face, is-it is unarguable
that the existing remedies for breach of contract do not seek to protect a performance interest in this way; quite the contrary in fact.' 5
The positive law of remedies shows, as Farnsworth famously put it, "a
marked solicitude for men who do not keep their promises."' 6 Exem9. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60
L. REV. 589, 597-610 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Longterm Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassicaland Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 899-905 (1978).
10. See David Campbell, The Undeath of Contract: A Study in the Degenerationof
a Research Programme,22 H.K. L.J. 20, 20-21 (1992).
11. Brian Coote, Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest, 56
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 537, 542 (1997).
12. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
13. Daniel Friedmann, The PerformanceInterest in ContractDamages, 111 LAW 0.
VA.

REv. 628, 629 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Restitutionarydamages for breach of contract; Snepp and
the fusion of law and equity, 1987 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 421 (1987) and Peter
Birks, Profits of Breach of Contract, 109 LAW Q. REV. 518, 518-21 (1993).

15. In what follows I shall concentrate on the law of England and Wales. The law
of the United States and of other common law jurisdictions is not different in principle, and indeed a great deal of our understanding of the law of England and Wales is
based on analyses of the United States' position.
16. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L.

REv. 1145, 1216 (1970).
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plary damages are not normally available in contract, unless the parties clearly have contracted with the express intention that they should
be and then the basis of those damages is purported compensation of
the claimant's non-pecuniary loss rather than the explicit punishment
of the defendant or the deterrence of breach. 7 Ignoring the special
case of debt, 8 literal enforcement is an exceptional remedy available
only when normal damages are shown to be inadequate, and even
then it may be denied if the cost it imposes on the defendant is found
to be out of reasonable proportion to the benefit it will convey on the
claimant.1 9 The quantification of damages on the basis of compensation of lost expectation, subject to limits of causation and net of mitigation, tends to keep those damages as low as possible, consistent with
protection of the claimant's expectation thus quantified.2" A number
of relatively minor doctrines are to the same effect.2
In sum, our thinking about remedies remains dominated by Fuller
and Purdue's2 2 very robust, if not, as we will see, entirely coherent
explanation of that law as aiming at the protection of (net) expectation rather than the enforcement of primary performance. Broad acceptance of this explanation shows the claim that the essence of
contract is performance to be contradicted by the fact that the existing
law of remedies unarguably is based not on literal enforcement, but
on shifting from primary obligations to the secondary obligation to
provide a remedy2 3 and that remedy will only exceptionally be literal
enforcement of the primary obligation. It is unarguable that this shift
usually gives the defendant an incentive (which must be balanced
against counter-incentives) to breach.
It is for this very reason that those advocating the performance interest regard the system described by Fuller and Purdue as fundamentally inadequate and in need of reform, the basic argument being that
"[t]he expectation interest is simply an inappropriate term describing
the performance interest. ' 24 Not only the academic literature, but in
the important cases where the wider use of non-compensatory damages is currently being developed in England and Wales are replete
with outraged claims that the expectation principle permits important
injustices to occur. In the leading case, A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape
17. DONALD HARRIS ET AL., REMEDIES IN CONTRACT AND TORT 579-608 (2nd
ed. 2002).
18. Id. at 158-66.
19. Id. at 153-226.
20. Id. at 3-24, 73-130.
21. See, e.g., id. at 75-76 (referring to the "minimum obligation rule").
22. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, (1936) 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52-96; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:2, (1936) 46 YALE L.J. 373, 373-420 (1936).
23. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.
24. Friedmann, supra note 13, at 632.
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Ltd. Third Party),25 which the Court of Appeal has claimed "mark[ed]
a new start in this area,"'2 6 it was observed that:
If the court is unable to award restitutionary damages for breach of
contract, then the law of contract is seriously defective. It means
that in many situations the plaintiff is deprived of any effective remedy for breach of contract, because of a failure to attach a value to
the plaintiff's legitimate interest in having the contract duly
performed. 27
The Court of Appeal and a majority of the House of Lords in Blake
accordingly have made it possible that restitutionary damages, up to
and including total disgorgement of the profits of breach, might be
sought in simple contract cases.28
This criticism of the expectation principle is so very overdone as to
be quite misleading, and the alternative which is proposed, of giving
much greater weight to literal enforcement or to (particularly restitutionary) damages which amount to much the same thing, is far inferior
to limited literal enforcement and damages based on the protection of
(net) expectation. I have argued this on numerous previous occasions 29 and, in briefly recapitulating my argument here, I will concentrate upon the outraged moralistic tone of current criticism of the
expectation principle. This follows not from thinking that the expectation principle is ill-suited to prevent breach, which it is, but from taking it for granted that it should seek to prevent it, which it should not.
Were the current law of remedies properly understood, it would not
attract criticism of this sort.
The most moralistically agonised criticism which has been lodged
against the expectation principle is that it allows "efficient breach."
When economically rational parties enter into a contract, analytically
they do so in the belief that this commitment of their resources will
maximise their utilities over the time of performance. Of course, as
their rationality is bounded, there inevitably will be a risk that they
are wrong, and one way in which they may be wrong is that they may
have failed to identify a superior maximising opportunity available
during that time. Upon learning of a sufficiently superior opportunity,
25. [1997] EWCA Civ. 3008.
26. Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v.P.P.X Enter. Inc., [2003] EWCA Civ. 323 para.
16.
27. Blake, [1997] EWCA at para. 35.
28. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 262-68; David Campbell & Donald Harris, In
Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the PerformanceInterest, 22 LEGAL
STUD. 208, 217-21 (2002) (discussing the crucial point of the relationship of Blake to
"efficient breach"); D. Campbell, The Treatment of Teacher v Calder in AG v Blake,
65 MOD. L. REV. 256 (2002). Developments subsequent to Blake are described in
David Campbell & Philip Wylie, Ain't No Telling (Which CircumstancesAre Exceptional), 2003 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 605, 605-30.
29. See generally the references given in the previous note and David Campbell,
Hamlet without the Prince: How Leng and Leong Use Restitution to Extinguish Equity,
2003 J. Bus. L. 131, 131-41.
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the defendant will have a rational incentive to breach and recommit
his resources to the exploitation of that opportunity. So long as he
adequately compensates the claimant, it will be efficient to allow him
to do so. The net result will be identical for the claimant and superior
for the defendant.
As the costs to the defendant of breaching the original contract are
his lost expectation (and wasted reliance) on that contract and his liability for the claimant's lost expectation and wasted reliance, efficient
breach is possible only because the expectation principle normally
minimise that liability. Were the performance interest protected by
normal literal enforcement or (restitutionary) damages to the same
effect, the defendant's incentive to breach would be lowered to the
extent that he will be required to disgorge the profit he would make.
If literal enforcement were certain to be carried out (e.g., were the
defendant to be forbidden to pay the claimant to relax an order of
specific performance), or were the total disgorgement damages logically required by restitution certain to be imposed, the defendant
would have no incentive to breach at all, and no efficient breach
would be possible. That such breach is possible under the expectation
principle is the strongest possible indication to the proponents of the
performance interest that that principle is inadequate. 30 The outrage
is even more pronounced when the claimant's damages are nominal
because he suffers no loss on compensatory principles, or suffers a loss
which is not thought to justify the cost to the defendant of remedying
it. It is here that the performance interest thinking has made its greatest progress so far in England and Wales, for it is now usually the case
that, when breach of a restrictive covenant in a sale of land would lead
to only nominal damages quantified according to the expectation principle, the claimant will be able to obtain damages which require the
defendant to partially disgorge the profits of his breach.3
Though, to my knowledge, the term efficient breach was coined in
1977,32 and the first formal statement of the concept was made as recently as 1970, 3 the idea of an efficient breach which allows the defendant to maximise his utilities is traceable to Holmes' famous
observation that: "[T]he only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the
promised event does not come to pass. [The law of contract] leaves
30. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-24
(1989).
31. The leading case is Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v Parkside Homes Ltd.
[1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.
32. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558-77 (1977).
33. Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 273-92 (1970).
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[the promisor] free to break his contract if he chooses."3 4 This observation smacks of the cynicism of Holmes's "bad man, ' 35 and so is
anathema to those classical lawyers and modern Langdellian formalists who regard breach as a wrong. But it is also seen this way by most
contributors to the relational theory.3 6 Both Macaulay, in the shining
decency of his general attitude to the legitimate use of the law,3 7 and
Macneil, in his more formal accounts of contract's normative foundations, 38 have placed an explicit morality at the heart of contract, to
which the attitude of the bad man seems repugnant. It is no surprise,
then, that both have launched extremely hard-hitting attacks on efficient breach. I have discussed these elsewhere, 39 so want here only to
distinguish two lines taken by these attacks. The first line turns on
showing that breaches can take place under the guise of efficient
breach which are not efficient at all, because the claimant is not, in
fact, adequately compensated, 0 and with this line I have no basic disagreement. I do, however, disagree with a second line taken by the
relational criticism of efficient breach, which is to claim that the amorality of the defendant's conduct is reprehensible even when the claimant is compensated, and, in fact, that in the moral world of contract,
good faith parties just do not behave in this way. In a very important
passage, Macneil claims that:
In the real world of commerce, opportunities for gain through 'efficient breach' of transactions in goods other than true futures deals
are so rare as to be almost non-existent. There simply are not many
chances for deliberate breaches of this kind, and general propositions about remedies based on them tell singularly little about effi34. O.W.

HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW

301 (1881). 1 formed my views on

these matters before I read Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on
Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1085-106
(2000), and although I have benefited greatly from this excellent paper, though I am
afraid my views on Holmes and on efficient breach remain quite opposed to those of
Professor Perillo.
35. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
36. See Ian R. Macneil, A Primer of Contract Planning,48 S. CAL. L. REV. 627,
692 (1975). See also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1696 (1976).
37. Everything Macaulay has written on the subject demonstrates this quality, but
I particularly refer the reader to the captivating account of an "organic transaction" in
Stewart Macaulay, Organic Transactions:Contract,Frank Lloyd Wright and the Johnson Building, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 75, 75-122.
38. Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
340, 346-66 (1983).
39. David Campbell, Breach and Penalty as ContractualNorm and Contractual
Anomie, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 681, 687-91. I have used some paragraphs of this discussion in the current paper.
40. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,1985 Wis. L. REV. 465,
469-70; Ian R. Macneil, Essays on the Nature of Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159,
183-84 (1979); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REV. 947, 947-49 (1982); Ian R. Macneil, Contract Remedies: A Need for a Better
Efficiency Analysis, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 6, 14 (1988).
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ciency in the real world. What does happen in the world of
contracts-often in clear violation of legal rules of contract remedies-is that people get themselves into trouble in an incredible variety of ways, both ingenious and disingenuous, and are unable or at
the very least think themselves unable to perform. Their position at
that time comes much closer to impossibility and serious impracticability than it does to deliberate breach, even when they led themselves into the morass.'"
III.

THE

Two RULES IN ROBINSON v. HARMAN

This attitude to efficient breach, shared across the range of contractual scholarship, including by many of the leading proponents of the
relational theory, is mistaken. The mistake involves unduly concentrating on efficient breach, rather than on breach itself. For the very
considerable attention which efficient breach has received is in
marked contrast to the, from the perspective which is being advanced
here, opposite form of breach, though this form is far more important;
indeed determining the correct policy towards it is the most important
issue in the law of contract remedies. The purpose of what has been
called efficient breach is to allow the defendant to maximise a gain.
But far more important than this maximising breach is the breach
which has the purpose of minimising loss.4 2 This is, indeed, the typical

case of breach, though not generally recognised as such.
When the defendant undertakes a primary contractual obligation,
he does so in the belief that performance of that obligation will cost a
certain amount. As we have noted, that this belief inevitably will be
based on bounded rationality at the time of the agreement means that
a risk always attends a contractual undertaking. One risk is the efficient breach risk that, even if the original contract goes as planned, a
better contract could have been made. In other cases, however, the
risk that the original contract does not go as planned becomes manifested in a rise of the costs the defendant incurs in performing. Any
rise in the cost of complete performance above the defendant's original estimate will reduce the defendant's expected profit margin, and
thus the defendant's own expectation interest, and beyond a certain
point the rise will extinguish that margin completely (leaving the defendant in a "break-even" contract, where receipts equal costs), or
make the margin negative (leaving the defendant in a "losing contract," where receipts are lower than costs). The enormous variation
in the empirical circumstances which give rise to these outcomesunanticipated shortage of raw materials, destruction of premises by
41. Ian R. Macneil, Contract Remedies: A Need for a Better Efficiency Analysis,
144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 6, 15 (1988).
42. Cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 254-55 (4th
ed. 2004) (noting the distinction between the "fortunate" and the "unfortunate"
contingency).
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fire, etc.-should not obscure the fact that (the terms not being in
dispute) it is always a rise in the cost of performance that gives the
good faith defendant an incentive to breach.
At zero transaction costs, in a world where each party was fully informed about all the circumstances, including relevant future events,
and negotiation was costless, the parties would draw up a completely
contingent contract that exhaustively specified all the parties' rights
and obligations in every possible situation, and provided a set of procedures and remedies to deal with every conceivable aspect of nonperformance. But, of course, finding all the relevant information and
fully negotiating terms to incorporate it into the contract incurs positive transaction costs, and contracts cannot be the completely contingent products of perfect rationality. The state of the world (including
its potential for change) will not exist as the parties believed at the
time of the contract, for their knowledge of that state, and their ability
to calculate the consequences of what they do know will be limited, as
is their ability to negotiate, and it is this limitation that leads to risk.
In all contracts, there is an allocation of risks to the parties. This
allocation takes place within certain limits to the extent that any defendant can be required to absorb risk. There is a fundamental limit
to the extent that the defendant could be obliged to perform even
when his costs are rising which is set by the possibility of his becoming
bankrupt or going into liquidation. There is a lower limit set by the
possibility of the contract being discharged for common mistake or
frustration,4 3 though this is almost otiose because it is so rarely
granted. In the great majority of cases, however, a more relevant limit
is set and the general possibility of breach created, by the quantification of damages according to the expectation principle. When the
costs of performance exceed the costs of breach, the defendant has a
rational incentive to breach. Because, as we have seen, the costs of
breach are the defendant's and the claimant's lost expectation and
wasted reliance, the costs of breach can be lower than the costs of
performance only if damages are normally quantified on a compensatory basis and there is an incentive to mitigate so that the claimant is
compensated only for lost net profit; or, to put it the other way
around, only if literal enforcement is an exceptional remedy. The fact
remains that the remedies system is like this and results in the most
important sensible course of action for the claimant after breach is
normally to take commercial cover by finding a substitute and being
compensated for his net loss, if any. Exceptions to the basic position
must be considered when cover is inadequate to protect the claimant's
expectation.
If the damages system works in the sense that damages actually are
adequate, the claimant should be indifferent whether the defendant
43. These are the analogues to commercial impracticability in the law of England
and Wales.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss2/14
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I2.13

10

Campbell:
The Relational Constitution
of Remedy: Co-Operation
as the Implic
OF REMEDY
CONSTITUTION
RELATIONAL
2005]

pays damages or performs. The issue should be whether the defendant be made to perform or to pay compensatory damages when both
protect the claimant's expectation; and, if the defendant decides that
breach is a less costly way of doing this than performance, the defendant should be allowed to breach. To compel the defendant to perform will protect the claimant's expectation, but ex hypothesi,
damages will do this more cheaply than literal enforcement. As no
benefit will be conferred by making the defendant protect the claimant's expectation by the more expensive method of literal enforcement, the defendant should be allowed to elect the cheaper method.
Nor is this a matter of being unilaterally generous to the defendant.
As rational pricing requires the parties to include the cost of potential
liability for breach, the claimant will benefit from a lower price because mitigation lessens the cost of liability. I would hazard the hypothesis that it is competition over this aspect of contracting that has
made contracts which minimise liability the norm and this is reflected
in the expectation principle being the default rule of remedies. To do
otherwise than adopt what Goetz and Scott have called this "principle
of joint-cost minimisation" 4 of loss would be to impose pointless
waste on the parties which they themselves normally avoid.
When one wishes to understand and properly evaluate the contract
remedies system, it is absolutely vital to appreciate that, in complete
contradiction of what has always been claimed for pacta sunt servanda
and is now being claimed for its modern statement as the performance
interest, it does not necessarily matter to commercial parties whether
the primary obligation is performed or enforced. The institution of
contract is the general form of regulation of economic exchange, but,
in a most important sense, the legal institution is not what is essential.
It is the economic exchange, and particularly the surplus that the parties intend to realise through their exchange, that is essential. The
actual performance of the contract is incidental to obtaining the surplus, indeed it is a cost of obtaining that surplus and an understanding
of contract remedies that turns on seeing expectation of surplus is
what matters, not actual performance of the obligation. In a contract
that is performed, expectation is protected by performance. In a contract that is breached in good faith, something has happened to make
performance more costly, and though the overriding goal remains protection of the claimant's expectation, this should, in order to avoid
waste, be done as cheaply as possible and alternatives to performance
44. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of ContractualObligation,69 VA. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (1983). Schwartz's
interesting advocacy of wider use of specific performance is readily reconcilable with
this stance, for it does not envisage actual literal enforcement being the result of his
suggestion but believes, generally wrongly in my view, that post-breach negotiations
will be improved if that suggestion is adopted. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L. J. 271, 271-307 (1979). See also Timothy J. Muris, The Costs
of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1053, 1053-69.
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should be considered. Both the law of contract's general recourse to
compensatory damages rather than literal enforcement and its mitigating principles of quantification of damages can be explained only
on this basis. In sum, we might say that the fundamental goal of the
law of contract is to put the claimant in the position he would have
been in had the contract been performed (that is, to protect the claimant's expectation), but by the means which imposes least cost on the

defendant. As it has been put by Andersen: "[R]emedies for breach
of contract ... attempt to accommodate two competing goals ...

(1)

securing to the injured party the benefit of the bargain, (2) without
imposing unnecessary costs on the breaching party."45
In the law of England and Wales, "the rule in Robinson v. Harman"
states what has come to be known as the "first principle" of contract
damages: "where a party sustains a loss by reason of breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been
performed."46 By stressing that the aim is to put the claimant where
he would have been had the contract been performed, the rule in
Robinson v. Harman makes protection of future expectation the basis
of compensatory damages. In Robinson v. Harman itself, a defendant
who had failed to convey a lease was liable not merely for the claimant's wasted expenses (in modern terms, reliance loss), but also for the
extra cost of leasing a similar property from a third party (in modern
terms, expectation loss). In one important respect, Robinson v.
Harman expanded the defendant's liability, which was argued to extend only to reliance loss, but it did so in the way sympathetic to the
defendant with which we are now familiar. The expectation loss was
calculated as the difference in the rent of the third party's property
minus the contracted rent, (i.e., in modem terms, market damages)
when, to labour the point, the claimant mitigates by securing a
substitute.
I submit that the full significance of Robinson v. Harman lies in its
articulation of two principles of contract damages: protection of the
claimant's expectation, with protection in such a way as to minimise
the defendant's expense. If the protection of the claimant's expectation were the only aim of the system of remedies, it would be impossible to say why, for example, that system requires mitigation by the
claimant rather than simply allowing the claimant to let his consequential losses mount up, for either would protect the claimant's expectation. The same could be said of all the choices of remedies that
45. Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L.
299, 306 (1988). One might say that the first compensation principle of damages
is supplemented by a second efficiency principle in the instance of the common law's
combination of compensation and efficiency discussed in Cooter's seminal article:
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
REV.

CAL.

L. REv. 1, 1-51 (1985).

46. [1848] 1 Ex. 850, 855.
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flesh out the preference for compensation over literal enforcement.
To obtain a basic explanation of the system of remedies, one must see
that Robinson v. Harman itself expresses the two rules set out by Andersen, and together these rules articulate the co-operative project of
joint cost minimisation within a contractual framework. The immediate distinctness of the parties to a contract is recognised in the first
rule in Robinson v. Harman, indicating a general privilege of the
claimant's over the defendant's interests (whereas in a firm a breakdown, plans corollary to a breach could be met by revision of those
plans which was prepared to alter the plans of all production units
within the firm regardless of which unit was responsible for the breakdown). The ultimate co-operation of those parties, both within the
instant contract and in the economy over time, is recognised by the
second rule. It is the shortcoming of the contemporary Langdellian
formalist insistence upon the performance interest that it does not
even see the existence of this second rule (except as defects in the
system of remedies), and it is the shortcoming of relational theory that
it does not see that the second rule, though giving an incentive to
breach, is basically co-operative.
IV.

WHY PARTIES BREACH CONTRACTS

To explain why these two rules have been developed, and in particular why the second compliments the first, one has to understand why
contracts are breached. At considerable risk of exposing myself to
ridicule, I have prefaced this paper with a quote from one of John von
Neumann's papers which have proved to be the foundations of modern computing, which I attempted to read when trying to come to
terms with game theory. Much of it is incomprehensible to me, but
insofar as I understand the matter, one of von Neumann's contributions to the conceptualisation of computing problems was to recognise
that error can not be eliminated,4 7 and the goal of eliminating error
from calculation is illusory. One should first be aware of this, and so
not put excessive faith in one's results, and then try to manage the
inevitable failure. In computing, von Neumann's basic strategy was to
duplicate the calculation on various computers (or parts of computers)
and work from some samples of the multiple results.
Without wishing to put any weight on what is intended purely as a
heuristic device, I submit that an analogue to this happens in the market economies. It is obvious that in those economies, composed of
countless numbers of exchanges of varying degrees of complexity,
dealing with those inevitably occurring contracts in which one party
finds his costs during performance growing in an unanticipated way
47. The mechanical reliability of the computing machines available to von
Neumanm was considerably poorer than that of contemporary computers, but the
basic point still holds.
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(telling him he made a mistake, in the lay sense, by agreeing this contract) is a major problem. The mechanism for handling this problem
is central to the efficiency of the market economy. 48 The fundamental
mechanism is adjustment of obligations by the parties without recourse to legal action, but this is encouraged by limiting the extent to
which performance can legally be insisted upon in the way we have
seen. It is breach that is most important in setting this limit; more so
than insolvency, which nevertheless itself has a crucial role, and certainly more so than discharge for common mistake and frustration,
which, as I have said, are almost redundant because they are so rarely
granted. Breach allows flexibility into the system of exchanges, allowing parties relief from unanticipatedly expensive obligations when
further performance would merely be wasteful as the claimant can be
compensated in damages. In this sense, a major function of the law of
contract is to allow breach, but on the right occasions and on the right
terms; in essence, on terms which encourage claimants to cover in the
knowledge that the defendant will compensate lost net expectation.
This is to say, properly regulated breach, which does involve adequate
compensation, is normative contractual action.
All this, of course, assumes that it normally is possible to take cover,
but for commercial parties this normally is possible because the market economies are characterised by the ready availability of goods in
competitive supply, including a margin of excess capacity which allows
a buyer faced with breach to take cover. This margin functions inter
alia as the space in which inevitable misallocations of resources
through contract are adjusted through breach, or adjustment by the
parties which makes it unnecessary for the party experiencing difficulty to breach. Much economic theory viewing "excess capacity" in
the economy as a sign of malaise simply fails to take onboard this vital
function of such capacity in making the taking of cover widely possible. 49 This mistake is greatly exaggerated by legal theories of the performance interest, which simply have no inkling of the economic
48. A comparison with the extreme rigidities characteristic of the centrallyplanned command economies is useful. In such economies, an analogue to specific
performance played the major role as a remedy for failure to comply with obligations
under the plan because satisfaction of the plan was the goal of economic action. See
Bernard Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Communist Economy, 72 YALE L. J. 1326, 1326-46 (1963). See generally Wang Liming, Specific Performance in Chinese Contract Law: An East-West Comparison, 1 ASIA-PAc. L. REV.
18 (1992). Of course, as much as in any system, obligations were entered into under
imperfect information and with limited computational power, and so their performance was subject to unexpected rises in costs. Though a whole legion of semi-illicit
devices for modifying the plan would seem to have arisen (bribes to those who held
scarce goods, lying about plan fulfilment, etc.), the absence of a general possibility of
an analogue to breach to deal with these rises would appear to have caused an inflexibility which was a major weakness of these economies. See, e.g., J. Nos KORNAI, THE
SOCIALIST SYSTEM 131-60 (1992).
49. JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 81 (1961).
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difficulties that in their pursuit of general literal enforcement, would
require the terms of agreement so often to be right as to eliminate or
greatly reduce the necessity of breach.
The point of relevance to us is that cover is both efficient and cooperative in a way that undercuts the typical opposition of these qualities. In circumstances when the claimant can be compensated in damages, cover obviously is efficient, for insisting upon anything else
would satisfy the claimant's expectation at a higher cost to the defendant than the cost of the cover, and what would be the point of that?
The breach is efficient in this case because it minimises the defendant's
loss. But this efficiency emerges only because the claimant co-operates by taking cover. Allowing the defendant to breach and placing
the burden of mitigation on the claimant enlists the claimant's co-operation in dealing with the defendant's problems, one aspect of this
co-operation is it makes legal action unnecessary in cases where compensation is adequate. In this way, the "efficient breach" that leads to
cover in order to minimise the claimant's and the defendant's loss is, I
suggest, the fundamental provision giving an incentive to co-operation
in contract.
V.

CO-OPERATION ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONTRACTS

If my suggestion is accepted, much of the empirical evidence, such
as we have it, about contracting, as opposed to the law of contract,
becomes more readily reconcilable with that law. If the most detailed
formulation of the relational theory is due to Macneil, the arguments
that have made the necessity for an alternative theory to the classical
law are largely due to Macaulay, whose finding of "non-use"5 ° made
the classical law seem so irrelevant that, as we all know, when Gilmore proclaimed its death, he named Macaulay the executioner.5 1
The essential import of Macaulay's conception of non-use is that the
actual conduct of business, and particularly the resolution of disputes,
does not rely on formal legal provisions so much as informal, nonlegal understandings. 52 But in the typical business situation where
failure to deliver a satisfactory generic good is accompanied by a
ready market in that good, then non-use is exactly what one would
expect, not because of defiance of the legal rules, but because those
rules prescribe the taking of commercial cover rather than pursuit of a
legal remedy in the sense of a remedy that actively involves lawyers.
Equally, other apparently lenient responses to breaches, such as allowing repair or (rescheduling) redelivery when complete rejection
50. Stewart Macaulay, The Use and Non-use of Contracts in the Manufacturing
Industry, 9 PRACTICAL LAWYER 13 (1963).
51. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 113 n.1 (Ronald K. L. Collins
ed., 2d ed. 1995).
52. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 56 (1963).
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was possible, might be explained as sensible responses to the limited
extent to which the claimant, even if he or she pursued the formal
remedy, would actually find that it took her or him any closer to literal
enforcement of the defendant's primary obligations.
I hope to have at least plausibly advanced the hypothesis that, properly understood, parties to relatively simple contracts relying on standard remedies based on the expectation principle, those contracts that
Macneil would call discrete, 53 typically have recourse to the "remedy"
of what I have elsewhere called "forebearance '' 54 when faced with a
breach, because the remedies point them in this direction.
There
can be nothing so certain as that this is not properly understood by the
parties, which is an unsurprising state of affairs when the position is
not properly understood by most of the parties' advisers; but
forebearance is, I submit, the normal case. Revising our understanding here will require not only a readjustment of our view of the substantive law, but, even more, a readjustment of our view of the
practical use of that law. For Macneil surely is right, in the quotation
given above, to cast doubt on the number of cases of deliberate
breach. But, I submit, 56 "deliberateness" in this respect need not indicate bad faith. Rather, even on current understandings, it could indicate a good faith party being aware of his decision to breach, rather
than divesting responsibility by believing that further performance is
"impossible." "Even if . . . breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily
blameworthy," 5 7 for the deliberateness may just follow from clarity of
thought. I would go further and say that, on the understanding I am
seeking to put forward, deliberateness should indicate consciousness
of seeking co-operation from the potential claimant.
As Macaulay has led the way in telling us, 58 the vast majority of
disputes are settled by direct negotiations between the parties in
which compromises are reached in the light of all the factors they consider relevant. The efficiency and legitimacy of breach, the value of a
continuing relationship or of possible future business or, more widely,
of a commercial reputation, as opposed to the one-shot value of pur53. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and
the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus", 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1025-37

(1981).
54.

HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 27-40.
55. Though my account greatly differs from that of Macaulay, which worries me,
and is, as I have said, critical of parts of his work, which worries me even more, I have
gained great help from his analysis of the "compromises" which are integral to
Fuller's conception of the practical quantification of the reliance interest. Stewart
Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools' Doors, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 247, 282-87.
56. See also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 19.
57. Patton v Mid-Continent Sys. Inc., 841 F.2d. 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988).
58. Stewart Macauley, Elegant Models, EmpiricalPictures and the Complexities of
Contract,11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 507 (1977); Steward Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465.
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suing litigation most ruthlessly, must all be weighed.59 As I have said,
in previous work I have described the potential claimant who, after
breach, does not seek a formal remedy as "forebearing" from seeking
a remedy. I have used this term to try to indicate that her or his decision not to seek the remedy does not take the form of self-conscious
co-operation but of forebearance from seeking what, to the extent
they believe in pacta sunt servanda, they must believe is an ability to
compel the defendant to perform. This is a giving up of what the potential claimant perceives, however incorrectly, to be a right, for pragmatic reasons. For though the overwhelming weight of evidence is
that disputes will be settled out of court by compromise, the present
understanding of remedies encourages a "vindication of rights"
mentality in the conduct of litigation. 60 The most aggravated form this
takes, now deplored and intended to be corrected by recent reforms
of civil procedure in England and Wales, is the tendency of commercial litigation to:
degenerate into an environment in which the.., process is too often
seen as a battlefield where no rules apply. In this environment,
questions of expense, delay, compromise and fairness may have
only a low priority. The consequence is that expense is often excessive, disproportionate
and unpredictable; and delay is frequently
61
unreasonable.
To this I would add that an otherwise valuable business relationship
subjected to the strains of the "resolution" of a dispute in this way is
unlikely to survive that resolution, which would appear to be a very
substantial and largely unjustifiable cost which civil litigation imposes
on business.
Businesses can, and perforce do, avoid these costs by eschewing litigation conducted in this way, but the vindication mentality casts its
pall over post-breach negotiations where reference to the contract
takes the form of exchanges of surrenders of adversarially asserted
claims. The only general present corrective to this seems to be the
advice one imagines is given very commonly indeed, that the law in
practice falls short of the law in books (in which the client would get
his supposed full deserts), a very unsatisfactory position indeed.62
Self-consciousness of the co-operative element of contract is a necessary condition for improving the basic quality of advice in this regard.
Parties who are aware that the expectation principle encourages co59. See, e.g., James Shanteau & Paul Harrison, The Perceived Strength of an Implied Contract: Can It Resist Financial Temptation?, 49 ORGANISATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 2-8 (1991).

60.

HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACrS

350-55 (1999).

61. Lord Harry Woolf, Civil Justice in the United Kingdom, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
709, 710 (1997).

62. See generally IMMANUAL

KANT,

On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct

in Theory But It Is Of No Use In Practice, in
(1996).
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operation would not have to learn this by the expensive pursuit of
vindication through litigation which is almost always frustrated by settlement, is the unsatisfactory way in which the ubiquity of compromise
between good faith parties is currently made known to those parties.
I do not for a moment want to deny that the expectation principle
(or at least Fuller and Perdue's statement of it) is in need of reform,
not merely at its edges but in some more fundamental ways. But I do
think that its basic thrust is correct, and what has misled not only business parties but also classical and (some) relational scholars is that
they think primary obligations should be performed, when it is always
questionable whether they should. Self-consciousness of this would
allow the displacement of the always frustrated taste for litigation
based in the vindication of rights mentality to be replaced by a taste
for settlement based in an acknowledgement that the adequate form
of self-interest always acknowledges a role for co-operation.
I have developed these remarks by focusing upon contracts at the
discrete end of Macneil's spectrum of contracts. Towards the other
end, where are located contracts that I believe it is best to call "complex," 63 there is a much more developed awareness of the necessity of
co-operation between the parties. Indeed, the existence of this awareness was a major stimulus to Macaulay's and Macneil's development
of the relational theory. As the complexity of projects increases, it
becomes increasingly difficult to specify contractual obligations at the
time of agreement, and provision for explicit co-operation in the modification of broadly defined obligations must be made. This places obvious stress on the classical doctrines of agreement and sanctity, and it
is the point where they have fractured.
In previous work, I have analysed the necessary shift to a perspective of conscious joint maximisation in the agreement and performance of complex contracts,6 4 and I flatter myself that this work has
played some part in establishing the necessity of explicit co-operation
in complex contracting. Hoping here to stress the absolute centrality
of co-operation in all contracts, there is one aspect of the analysis I
have previously made of co-operation in complex contracts that I
should now like to revise. In this analysis, that I believe in this respect
perfectly captured the tenor of relational contract thinking at the time,
the emphasis was on the flexibility in how the parties regarded their
obligations, and the contract itself almost dropped out of view. Modifications apparently unconstrained by, or in direct defiance of, explicit
contractual provisions were shown to be a commonplace of business
contracting, and were regarded positively as showing up the weakness
of the classical law of contract, as indeed they did. But if the crucial
issue was the existence of a region of non-use governed by non-con63. Campbell, supra note 3, at 15-20.
64. David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term ContractualRelationships: The Role of Co-operation, 20 J.L. & Soc. 166 (1993).
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tractual relations, it became hard to see why commercial parties to
complex contracts bothered with contracts at all. When, having established the existence of the region of non-use, Macaulay later sought to
give formal remedies any place in this region, his principal example
was their use only as a fallback when relations collapse in unusual
circumstances such as "major shocks to the world economic system."6 5
To single out Macaulay in this way is most unfair,6 6 for, as I hope I
have made clear, he certainly, at least as much as any other contributor, has set the paradigm for basic research in contract over the last
forty years, certainly including the research that has produced this paper. But it is for just this reason that I think it important to refer to
limits in even his analysis.
The mistake is, I now believe, to confuse contracts agreed on the
basis of the parties' (and their advisers') inadequate classical understandings of contract with "formal contract" as such, and especially
with formal contract as it might be reformed were parties able (to
receive adequate advice and therefore) to contract free of the classical
illusions of pacta sunt servandaand their contemporary exhumation as
the performance interest. In complex contracts, the contractual documents were agreed in order to signal the existence of an ultimately
legally enforceable agreement (and hopefully to plan at least some of
the details of performance and what would be done in the likely or
inevitable event of difficulties arising with that performance).6 7 But,
in certain circumstances, that were common enough given the gulf between the classical contract and at all complex "economic deals" made
within at all complex "business relationships,, 6 8 the contract could
substantially hinder the productive resolution of disputes, and so was,
in regard of these circumstances, ignored. The important difference,
to which Macaulay has obliged us to pay attention, was between the
"real" and the "paper" deals.6 9
But, of course, the contract remained, and even if not taken out the
draw where the parties left it, it could exercise an influence on the way
the parties dealt with disputes, and whether complex relational contracts could ever represent really non-contractual relations is, it is submitted, highly questionable. 70 Even in functioning complex contracts,
the classical remedies remain as possible threats and the parties' rela65. Macaulay, supra note 40, at 472.
66. Especially in the light of Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract,supra note
40.
67. Macneil, supra note 36, at 629-701.
68. COLLINS, supra note 59, at 129-32.
69. Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity, and the Urgefor TransparentSimple Rules, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 3, 51-102 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
70. EDWIN M. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 130-31 (1968).
This is quoted in H. Beale & T. Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning
and the Use of ContractualRemedies, 2 BRITISH J. LAW & Soc'Y 45 (1975), still the
leading British paper reproducing Macaulay's analysis, which strives to emphasize the
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threats in the background, a backin the foreground. The classical
but they may have a most important
parties, for their existence, and the

possibility that they may be invoked, radiates an influence 7 1 on the

nature of any settlement and on any continuing relation. 72 To the extent that they in this way encourage the vindication mentality, the formal remedies remain to pose a problem. To improve the contribution
of the law to business,7 3 it would appear to be necessary, from the

point of view of the substantive law, to in future design remedies that
more facilitate and less hinder the making of the necessary (and therefore legitimate) modifications of obligations in relational contracts.74
VI.

CO-OPERATION AND THE NEW FORMALISM

It is here that the recent development of a "new formalism" intended to be part of the relational theory by contributors extremely
sympathetic to that theory, notably Schwartz and Scott, seems to me
to offer a great deal.7 ' This is by no means the Langdellian formalism
that lies behind the performance interest, but an "instrumental" argument that basing adjudication on a "literalist" approach to relatively
clear, formal rules around which competent parties can then bargain
to achieve specific outcomes, will be superior to trying to determine
those outcomes directly, for the courts cannot really know what the
intentions of the parties are in complex contracts. The basic impulse
ways in which it does not amount to evidence of completely non-contractual relations.
I am grateful to Hugh Beale for instructive conversations on this point.
71. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES
ABOUT COURTS 117, 121-24 (Keith 0. Boylum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983).
72. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 783-94 (1984).
73. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 249-55 (1984). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Symposium on Business Lawyering and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR.
L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1995).

74. And this, indeed, is what is happening in the drafting of the new standard
forms of construction and engineering contracts in the U.K. E.g., THE INSTITUTION
OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, THE ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 3 (2d ed.

1995) (noting the first "core" clause of the contract provides that: "The Employer, the
Contractor,the Project Managerand the Supervisor shall act as stated in this contract
and in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation").
75. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Contracts and JudicialStrategies,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-318 (1992); Robert
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847,
847-76 (2000); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). Without detracting from
the value of the important papers of Schwartz and Scott, I am of the opinion that John
Kidwell made the fundamental point almost twenty years ago at a previous Wisconsin
Law School contracts conference: John Kidwell, A Caveat, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 615,
615-22.
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behind the new formalism is a belief that, if they stick to the provision
of a relatively simple framework of formal rules around which competent commercial parties can negotiate, the courts will be sticking to
what they do best:
The common law interpretive methodology is grounded on the implicit assumption that courts function well when they operate within
tightly constrained, formal modes of analysis. Courts will perform
poorly, on the other hand, where they attempt.., actively [to regulate] complex economic activity.76
To the extent that courts have tried to do the latter, they "crowd
77
the typically superior efforts of the parties themselves, either
because the law explicitly supplants the parties' own decisions or because the willingness of the courts to intervene creates an incentive to
seek rents rather than properly negotiate. We currently get the proper
spheres of the competence of the courts and of the parties to complex
contracts wrong:
Formalist modes of interpretation are justified because, and only
because, they offer the best prospect for maximising the value of
contractual relationships, given the empirical conditions that seem
to prevail . . . the case for formalism in relational contract turns on
the relative implausibility of the empirical conditions necessary for
activist [adjudication]: competent courts and incompetent parties.
The evidence from the cases adjudicating contract disputes . . .is
that the more likely empirical condition is competent parties and
incompetent courts.78
The lesson we should draw from this is that:
A normative theory of contract law that takes party sovereignty seriously shows that much of the expansion of contract law over the
last fifty years has been ill-advised. Contract law today is composed
of a few default rules, many default standards, and a number of
mandatory rules. Most of the mandatory rules should be repealed
or reduced to defaults, and most of the defaults should vanish from
the law. Advocating freedom of contract for firms is uncontroversial. Taking freedom of contract seriously, however, would radically
truncate current contract law. A law merchant appropriate to our
time would be a merchants'
79 law; and for merchants, the less publicly
supplied law the better.
out '

76. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts, supra note 74, at
875-76.
77. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, supra note 74, at

1645.

78. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts,supra note 74, at 875.

79. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 74, at 619.
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Though I believe that the crowding out problem is not nearly as
great as they seem to allege, 8° I agree with the argument against intervention made by Schwartz and Scott. I would, however, like to make
two further points. First, the thrust of Schwartz's and Scott's argument is that courts are reducing the value of complex contractual relationships to competent commercial parties by intervening when they
should not. I myself am as much concerned about the costs and consequences of committing the valuable and scarce public resource of
court time to the assistance of competent commercial parties in this
way. I see no compelling reason why the courts should, even if they
could, provide an extensive negotiation and dispute resolution service
in this way to business parties who really should provide for these
expenses themselves, either by planning for dispute avoidance or dispute resolution, or by integrating the formerly separate stages of the
production process, or by not undertaking this form of production if
the transaction costs of doing so are prohibitive.
Second, and more important in this context, the paternalistic impulse undercuts the relational theory in two ways. It leads to inappropriate interventions in the dealings of competent commercial parties,
as the new formalists argue; and, I would add, by tarring potentially
appropriate paternalist interventions in the dealings of relatively incompetent parties such as consumers with the same brush, it undermines the case for even these interventions. For, of course, along the
spectrum of contracts, different degrees of state involvement are necessary to produce optimum outcomes, and terms that not merely cannot but should not be provided by the state in contracts between
competent parties must be provided in contracts when one of the parties is relatively incompetent. The, as it were, vicarious co-operation
between the parties supplied by the paternalist intervention of the
state is as obvious in these latter cases as is the co-operation of competent parties to complex contracts adopting "non-contractual relations." I would say that an important source of misunderstanding
amongst those committed to the relational theory is that they often
have different contracts in mind when arguing about the appropriate
role for the state. For contracts between competent commercial parties, the state's role should be kept to a minimum, and the state certainly should eschew paternalist intervention. The resultant contract
will, nevertheless, be relational in the most important sense that it will
be based on co-operation, because co-operation is the essential product of the relations of good faith parties.8 1
80. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Freedomfrom Contract:Solutions in Search of
a Problem?, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 777-820 and William C. Whitford, RelationalContracts
and the New Formalism, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 631-43.
81. Macneil, supra note 53, at 1034 (stating "similarity of interests may be produced by external forces such as sovereign law. But. . . solidarity may and does arise
internally in relations").
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VII.

EFFICIENT BREACH REVISITED IN THE
LIGHT OF RELATIONAL THEORY

One can anticipate that, certainly in England and Wales, the new
formalist argument will run up against the critique of efficient (maximising) breach that has so galvanised the performance interest argument. I want to deal with this now. As I have said, I should not wish
to be thought as arguing that the expectation principle works perfectly
well. In this specific context, I would not wish to deny that the defendant's keeping the profits of efficient breach, to the disgust of the
claimant surprised to see these profits arise, would be unsatisfactory.
That the claimant may respond by refusing to deal with the defendant
in the future, and that the defendant may suffer loss of reputation in
the eyes of third parties, are important "non-legal" sanctions 82 which
may well push the defendant's calculation of "resultant wealth" beyond the horizon of the specific contract which he may consider
breaching, and so reduce the likelihood of breach. 83 But let us allow
that these sanctions do not alter the basic point, which is that there are
shortcomings to the expectation principle (and additional shortcomings in Fuller and Perdue's statement of it).
I should make explicit my implicit belief that the expectation principle (incorporating the second principle of co-operation) seems to me
to be the best conceivable system of remedies, a belief that is entailed
in my belief that the market is the best conceivable system for the
allocation of economic goods. But, to put the point the other way
around, just as one would have to be obtuse in the extreme to deny
the shortcomings of the market, one would have to be similarly obtuse
to deny the shortcomings of the expectation principle. The nature of
these shortcomings may be seen in its founding statement in Fuller
and Purdue's three interests analysis. Let us ignore the problems
which have beset the relationship between expectation and reliance,
and turn to those which beset the relationship of expectation and restitution. It is central to the argument of this paper that these
problems are very serious, for we have seen that general restitutionary
damages would be an important way of giving greater protection to
the performance interest, and so would be ultimately antithetic to the
expectation principle. But even if one tries to keep restitution within
"quasi-contractual" limits as a supplement to expectation, this must
ultimately prove to be theoretically unsatisfactory, because even to
have the two different, indeed, as I say, ultimately antithetic, principles simultaneously at work means that the problem always exists of
deciding when each principle should be invoked, and a proper solution of this will logically require a third overarching principle which
82. See David Charny, Non-legal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REV. 373, 408-25 (1990).

83. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981).
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subsumes both of the original principles of expectation and restitution. It is highly arguable that Fuller and Perdue's analysis is ultimately unsatisfactory for just this reason. However, I believe this
problem can be solved within the framework of Fuller and Purdue's
analysis, but I am not in a position to offer my solution, which is in no
fit state to be publicly presented at the moment. In this situation, I
must acknowledge these grave problems and say something about
what can be done about them now, in advance of their proper resolution, for their existence obviously undermines the case I am making
for the expectation principle.
In addition to the problem which might be caused by efficient (maximising) breach, let us also acknowledge that, what is typically much
more unsatisfactory than merely not sharing in a gain, the way the
expectation principle works through the rules on literal enforcement
certainly can leave the claimant with an outright uncompensated loss.
When cover is not possible, then consequential losses may be incurred, and if these losses are of an idiosyncratic nature that makes
them uncertain and remote, the claimant will be attracted to literal
enforcement. The claimant may be unable to show damages to be
inadequate, but he nevertheless is left (partially) uncompensated by
them. It is to avoid this sort of problem that commercial claimants
often seek literal enforcement when damages should, in theory, be
adequate to satisfy their commercial interest, but they fear that damages as actually quantified will leave them with an uncompensated idiosyncratic loss.' Even then, the analogues to the mitigation rules in
the law governing the award of the various forms of literal enforcement keep the defendant's costs as low as possible under these more
difficult circumstances and will even deny literal enforcement if it is

thought too costly to the defendant.85

I have discussed these problems, and the responses that have been
made to them, at length elsewhere.86 I believe co-operation is the key
to the management of these problems, but not the ex post co-operation we have already discussed, but co-operation ex ante the agreement, co-operation in negotiations. Let us imagine that two
commercial parties wish to commit themselves to a complex relationship in which, in general terms, it is foreseen that: (1) circumstances
may arise in which the defendant will gain windfall profits if he or she
breaches; and/or (2) the claimant will suffer an idiosyncratic loss if the
defendant breaches and literal enforcement is denied. The common
response to (2) is, of course, to plan for dispute resolution by, to take
84. An illustrative case is Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co. Ltd., [1927] 43 T.L.R. 170

(discussed in HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 172-73).
85. The leading case is Co-Op. Ins. Soc'y Ltd. v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd.
[1997] 1 W.L.R. 898, (discussed in HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 225-26).
86. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 17, at 262-68; Campbell & Harris, supra note
28, at 212-15.
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the clearest case, agreeing to bespoke remedies that supplant the normal expectation principles. Reflection on this makes it clear that the
same tactic is available in respect of (1). Bespoken remedies, perhaps
specifying restitutionary disgorgement in terms, may be agreed to
cover (1) as well as (2), for the expectation principle is not, of course,
in general mandatory, but is a default rule out of which the parties can
contract. Ignoring the various, often really quite indefensible, rules
relating the ousting of the default rules by competent commercial parties, 87 we can say that the solution to the problems we have acknowledged, of windfall profits and uncompensated losses, lie in the hands
of the claimant prior to agreement, for he or she can require a clause
giving the remedy he or she wants during negotiations.
Of course, one must be clear what one means by "solution" in this
respect. That circumstances arise which are not adequately foreseen
by the parties will not change just because they have made general
provision for them in the contract, but it should be recalled that it is
the basic argument of this paper that bounded rationality is ineluctable, and the persistence of these inadequately foreseen circumstances
can hardly be held against that argument. The point is how well the
parties, aware of the inevitable possibility of breach, deal with these
circumstances, if they arise, by negotiation before they arise. They
could agree not to oust the default rules, and so leave the possibility of
windfall gains with the defendant and of uncompensated loss with the
claimant. They could agree to oust the default rules and replace them
with some form of bespoke clause that in some way apportions any
gains and losses which might arise, or even tries to completely reverse
the allocation of risk under the default rules. Whatever they do will
not eliminate the problems that lead to breach, but will allocate the
risks it causes to the parties in the way they agree, and this, I submit, is
the best possible thing that can possibly be done to deal with risks that
can not be eliminated.
When actually faced with the eventuation of the unforeseen circumstance, the parties could, of course, decide to revise their agreed solution, in pursuit of a gain assessed over a longer period than that of the
instant contract. But let us ignore this particular possibility of co-operation, which the relational theory has thoroughly analysed. My argument is that, by requiring it to be made explicit that the parties
intention is to deal with these problems by ousting the default rule,
the remedies system forces the parties co-operatively to negotiate a
solution to these problems. But, of course, this way of handling the
problem requires that the parties have some general inkling of the
possibility that it will arise, and this requires them to realise that
breach can occur and that the default rules will in all likelihood not
seek to prevent it; just the opposite understanding, in fact, to that en87.

HARRIS ET AL.,

supra note 17, at 133-50.
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couraged by belief in pacta sunt servanda and the performance interest. Such a belief can be maintained only by denial of the
ineluctability of breach and that, therefore, "[s]ocial efficiency ... requires [parties] to restrain [their] reliance in light of the ... probability
of breach.""8 It then requires that the parties effectively negotiate the
allocation of risk and, I submit, they are more likely to be able to do
this if they take a co-operative attitude than if they attempt to secure
all possibility of gain to themselves and to impose all possibility of loss
on the counterpart. Beyond a certain point of complexity, negotiation
costs will be so large as to make the agreement impossible and the
exchange will have to be abandoned, or require the parties to integrate in order to allow the "exchange" to take place within the hierarchical structure of the firm. But even when the parties remain
distinct, they will have to adopt a co-operative attitude if they are to
have any hope of reaching a serviceable agreement about these complicated matters, for the more one seeks to get everything, the more
chance there is one gets nothing (or nothing but trouble).
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that breach, and the remedies system
which makes it possible, can be adequately explained only as a fundamentally co-operative legal institution. Grasping this has proven difficult for all theories of the law of contract, including even the
relational. The ultimate necessity of co-operation has mainly been visited on the law of contract by the ubiquity of settlement and by nonuse. Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that the relational theory can
accommodate the co-operative explanation of breach; something
which is entirely beyond the classical law and its revival in the form of
the performance interest.
And, of course, we should not be surprised by this. It is now quite
evident that the relational theory can deal with complex contracts far
better than the classical law. It should also be recognised that it is
similarly superior in respect of discrete contracts and competition.
For underlying the entire spectrum wherein these forms of contract lie
is the fundamental necessity of co-operation in exchange to which Macaulay and Macneil have drawn our attention. The superiority of the
relational theory over the classical law lies in the way that it is built
upon recognition of co-operation (from which competition within legitimate parameters can be coherently derived), whereas co-operation
can appear only as an overwhelming set of disturbing counter-examples to the individualism of the classical law.
88. Cooter, supra note 45, at 13.
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